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Garfinkel’s Conception of Time
Anne Warfield Rawls
ABSTRACT. Garfinkel articulates a significant conception of time –
as situated and sequential – that works in tandem with his rendering
of social order in terms of situated practices. However, because his
treatment of the actor, action, group and time in situated terms 
differs significantly from more conventional theoretical approaches,
critics have often mistakenly interpreted Garfinkel as focused on the
individual, and indifferent to the significance of social structures,
and their relations through time. What Garfinkel focuses on are 
practices, not individuals, and he argues that practices constitute the
essential foundations of social structure. Given this view, the time
dimension of practice is the significant time dimension for any study
of communication and/or social order, which are both constituted 
in and through situations defined by mutual orientation toward 
practice. KEY WORDS • ethnomethodology • Garfinkel • practice •
time • trust 
Introduction
Among the many criticisms of Garfinkel’s position, the complaint that he lacks
a conception of time has been one of the most persistent and damaging. In 
particular, it has kept many with an interest in issues of justice, inequality and
formal structures of authority from taking any serious interest in his work. This
criticism, like most others, however, is based on misunderstanding. Garfinkel
does have a significant conception of time, one that is uniquely suited to modern
practice-based social forms.
The criticism has been so damaging because of the widely held belief that a
conception of time is necessary in order to address problems of inequality and
social order that unfold historically and in different types of society. Without a
conception of time, after all, it is not possible to consider the possibility that
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things could be different – or to make historical comparisons – let alone attend
to the transformation from caste to class in relation to the economic and politi-
cal changes in modern societies. Consequently, any theory that does not have
what is considered to be an adequate conception of time is said to be conserva-
tive – that is, focused only on what is, at a single point in time, and therefore
unable to deal critically with questions of social justice and inequality, that is,
with questions of what ought to be.
Given Garfinkel’s commitment to the study of situated practice, interaction
that inhabits small bits of present time and local space, most scholars have
assumed that Garfinkel has no adequate conception of time and therefore that he
must have confused ought with is or, worse yet, have failed to consider the
ought problem altogether.
Furthermore, because detailed descriptions of a single practice seem to have
no relevance to other practices, in other times and locations, descriptions of
such practices are thought to lack generalizability, the main criteria for signifi-
cance employed by conventional social science. As a result, with regard to 
the so-called larger historical issues, Garfinkel’s approach has generally been
dismissed – even attacked – as trivial (Coser, 1975).
This is a mistake. Not only does Garfinkel have a conception of time. But,
that conception is relevant to the continually developing issues of justice and
inequality that confront modernity in ways that more traditional notions of time
have not kept pace with.1 A significant conception of time – one that might be
referred to as the ‘heartbeat’ of a modern practice-based social order – stands at
the very center of Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology. Conventional conceptions of
time are about social order, but they are not of it in this deeply intrinsic sense.
Why then the perception that Garfinkel has no conception of time?
The confusion has arisen primarily because Garfinkel’s position involves
transformations of several central ideas – including the conception of time – that
make his treatment of these ideas hard to see from a conventional perspective.
Because time is something different for Garfinkel, most scholars cannot see that
he is addressing time at all. But, it also follows that in so far as his idea of time
is completely different – and yet adequate to his subject – conventional criti-
cisms of his position are irrelevant. They are irrelevant, rather than wrong,
because Garfinkel’s transformations so completely change the field of argument
that the criticisms simply lose their meaning when applied to the domain of
social phenomena that he addresses.
Garfinkel is still talking about the essential issues – but the issues themselves
have changed as society has changed, and the way in which Garfinkel takes
them up is consequently unrecognizable to more traditional scholars. Garfinkel
has insisted on allowing social practices themselves to determine what can be
said about them: allowing empirical detail precedence over abstraction. New
ways of talking about social orders are necessary. But, these changes in both
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language and approach have been resisted by more conventional thinkers. It is a
case of what Thomas Kuhn (1958) would have called ‘normal’ versus ‘revolu-
tionary’ science. And, in keeping with classic cases of revolutionary science,
Garfinkel’s influence has increased as resistance to his position has also
increased. Even those who, in a friendly way, adapt something in the way of
‘methods’ from Garfinkel – not his point in any case – have generally felt the
need to marry his approach to some conventional theoretical abstraction.
This is always a mistake. Garfinkel’s position is neither a method nor a 
theory. It is a complete reconceptualization of how the coherence of the social is
made, coupled with an elaboration of the implications for studying it. It involves 
seeing things differently and thinking about them differently. But, the methods
– referred to by ethnomethodology – are not research methods. They are the
methods that ordinary persons use to create the recognizable order of the social
world they live in – ethno (folk)-methods.
Garfinkel’s Transformations: Actor, Situation, Group and Time
In approaching the problem of intelligibility and the achievement of coherence
in modern societies Garfinkel made four essential transformations that make 
his position incommensurate with existing perspectives on most points.2 These
four transformations involve the actor, situation, group and time, and each trans-
formation stands completely at odds with conventional social thought. Because
these transformations are essential to his position, and work together in tandem,
misunderstanding any one of them leads to a misunderstanding of the whole.3
With regard to the actor, Garfinkel turned his focus from whole biological
persons, whose demographic characteristics follow them from place to place,
toward what he referred to as the ‘actor.’ Although persons as such certainly
exist, in Garfinkel’s sense, they do not act. In a situated encounter the only thing
about a person that matters is their competence to participate and their commit-
ment to the ongoing situated practices and situated identities. Therefore, in
studying interaction, Garfinkel is concerned only with actors – performers of
situated identities. Because it is actors who perform identities and produce the
recognizable orders of situations, it is necessary to study the processes and
problems involved for actors in producing and maintaining situated identities in
particular local settings. To do otherwise, Garfinkel (1948/2005) argues, is to
produce a series of paradoxes.4 Thus, the conventional focus on demographic
characteristics, which preoccupies most social science, is, for Garfinkel, at best
a distraction – and at worst, completely obscures the issues involved in the 
production of social order; as do the methodological issues of generalizability
and reliability – tied to the collection of demographic data – which force
researchers away from details and toward abstractions.5
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Similarly, Garfinkel has no interest in locations as physical places with con-
crete historical characteristics. It is not physical space that gives coherence to
what we might still want to call the spacial characteristics of the places in which
actors act. For Garfinkel, places are situations whose coherence is given by the
practices which constitute them as situations of a particular sort. Practices have
relevant histories that may be of interest. But, a place can be constituted by one
practice at one time and a different practice at another. Practices define the 
situation and the identities that occur within it – not the location.
The same is true for physical objects, which Garfinkel (2002) refers to as 
‘oriented objects’ and ‘phenomenal fields’. ‘Things’ are made to appear as
objects of a sort only when oriented toward in specifiable ways in the context of
a practice. In the context of a different practice, objects will be made to appear
differently and will have different developing horizons.
Like actors and situations, social groups are not defined for Garfinkel by the
demographic characteristics of members, their kinship relations, or the cultural
practices and beliefs held by people across time, space and political con-
nections. Groups, are defined by the practices that constitute their membership.
That is, when a set of persons are mutually engaged in enacting a situated 
practice together in such a way that those practices define the relevant identities
and interactional possibilities for all involved – constituting them as a recogniz-
able and competent membership – they constitute a group.
Given these transformations of person, place and group, conventional con-
ceptions of time – conceptions designed to compare the actions and beliefs of
demographic persons and groups across physical spaces and cultural abstrac-
tions – would be of no use. This is a very important point. If time, as con-
ventionally conceived, arose as a way of making comparisons between demo-
graphic groups, physical locations and demographic persons, time in this sense
has no relevance for the study of the situated actors and situated practices which
inhabit the foreground in the situated landscape of modern life.
What Garfinkel needs to be interested in are those elements of actors, situa-
tions, interconnections between actors, and the situated order of practices, that
are constitutive of mutually intelligible practice in contexts of situated inter-
action. Only in so far as time is relevant to the production of order – in just these
terms – will Garfinkel concern himself with time.
This orientation toward time as a situated feature of interaction does not
ignore the ‘larger’ issues of inequality and power relations. It is in this inter-
actional foreground that essential issues of power and exclusion play out in
modern life. To the extent that mutually intelligible practice is necessary for 
the integrity of both self and interaction – and ‘trust’, in Garfinkel’s sense, is
necessary for the production of mutually intelligible practices – situated action
always has direct implications for justice and inequality.
Because practices require mutuality, they not only make egalitarian reciproc-
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ity possible, but also work to exclude those who cannot display the qualities
required for trust, creating new forms of exclusion and inequality that are mani-
fest only in situated action and not in the structures and beliefs of the ‘larger’
social structure. These forms of exclusion elude formal means of control,
including legislation and the formal measures of compliance that it depends on.
Therefore, focusing only on a combination of attitudes, beliefs and values,
and structural inequalities, entirely misses these new, and increasingly preva-
lent, forms of exclusion and inequality. This is one of the things that has made
race and gender discrimination so elusive from a conventional research per-
spective and enabled persons, governments, and corporations to continue 
practices of exclusion with impunity in a context of democratic law.6
The key to understanding both inequality and the possibility of egalitarian
exchange, in any practice-based social context, lies in the relationship between
situated orders and mutual intelligibility. Order and recognizability can only be
achieved if actors share some set of expectations – or practices – that provide
guidelines for how to use sounds and movements to create mutual understand-
ing in particular contexts of use.
The underlying question is: what do actors need to do to make themselves
understood by others – particularly others they know little about and have little
in common with? How do social events come to be ordered – as an ongoing
matter available for mutual inspection – in such a way that order is mutually
available and constitutive of the coherence of the events? And, how is Time
relevant to this endeavor – given the need to produce sounds and movements in
ways that convey a recognizable meaning to others?
Time as a Constitutive Relationship between Parts of Situated Interaction
Garfinkel’s conception of time, then, will need to be relevant to the constitutive
requirements of practices. How is something, that might be called time, relevant
to an actor’s production of identities and situated practices recognizably for 
others? What does it mean to say that time is constitutive of order and meaning?
The general perception has been that there is relatively little of interest about
time in this regard. But, that is because most of the thinking about this issue has
made use of conventional conceptions of time.
Just as Garfinkel’s position involves transformations of the conception of
person, place, and demographic group, it also involves a transformation of the
conception of Time. Rather than being a measure of something standing
between different events, Garfinkel treats time as a relationship between the
parts of a single event – a relationship that is constitutive of the organization,
and hence the meaning, of those parts. Situated time as an organizing feature of
interaction cannot be the time of groups, places, and demographic persons. It
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cannot be a time that follows persons from place to place, or one that tracks their
membership in demographic groups, or the transformation of demographic
groups over time.
Time for Garfinkel is a feature of situated interactional practices – and the 
situated actors who inhabit and construct the coherence of these fragile and 
temporary spaces – and as such, time turns out to play an essential role. It is time
as a constitutive relationship between the parts of a developing interaction,
rather than time as a measure of a relationship to a completed act that occurred
in some other place and time.
Most people, even when they insist that time is a social construction, never-
theless think of it either in terms of an historical time line existing outside of and
independently of situations, or as an inner duree experienced by each individual
alone. Garfinkel’s transformations are designed to take into account the situated
and socially produced character of all aspects of social orders – including time.
As such he avoids both the positivism and the solipsism of the conventional
view.
The coherences of interactional time are intrinsic and constitutive features of
the situations in which they are produced, and which time is intrinsic to the 
production of. But this does not make them unique and ‘non-generalizable’.
Rather, it means that they are available to all participating members as witness-
able productions. Mutual intelligibility requires that these coherences must be
available to participants – regardless of who they are, or what they believe –
simply on the basis of their competent and attentive (trustworthy) participation
in practices.7 Thus, constitutive features of time are distributed equally across
all competent and trustworthy members of the situated practice in which they
are produced.
This is one reason why generalizability is not a requirement for the study of
sequential orders. The coherence of a practice does not have to appear anywhere
else in the world in order to be a relevant organizational feature of this practice
here and now. Constitutive features of practice may be unique, and nevertheless,
be required for the achievement of recognizability in a given situated practice.
Modern societies are characterized by a situated form of interaction between
strangers and mere acquaintances that requires persons to orient directly toward
the production of meaning and order on the spot. It is not necessary to know
anything about the person, their beliefs and values, or their demographic 
characteristics, to do this. In fact, this is what makes mutual intelligibility possi-
ble in a democratic context. Furthermore, such interactions often involve the
mastery of practices that integrate technology with human actors in rapidly
changing ways. What persons bring with them in terms of personal characteris-
tics must be set aside in order to participate successfully in the practice at hand.8
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Situated Time and the Other-Oriented Character
The new modern form of character that results from the increasing importance
of situatedness in modern highly differentiated societies has been referred to by
David Riesman in The Lonely Crowd (1950) as ‘other oriented’, because actors
need to focus on the situated others and the situated requirements of the inter-
action, rather than on the principled requirements of traditions and beliefs. The
positive consequence is that interactional practice becomes more adaptable, and
in a densely populated multicultural society of strangers this form of adaptation
makes communicative reciprocity between strangers possible. But Reisman was
concerned that in the process of coming to focus more on the here and now of
interactional practice, the modern character might have become shallow,
because it is no longer focused on principles and beliefs.
This concern, which many others share with Reisman, associates morality
with traditional beliefs and principles, the conceptions of time they generate,
and the ability to make comparisons between them. This is ironic because those
who take this position also argue that these same historical social forms con-
stituted barriers to the achievement of justice and equality. It is because of a 
failure to consider this history that Garfinkel has been considered conservative.
Yet, a modern character who does not operate on the basis of traditional 
principles is considered to be shallow, lacking moral focus.
Garfinkel is alone in making the adjustments to thinking about where 
morality lies that are required by changes in contemporary social forms.
Somehow, in the face of a modern society that is increasingly based in situated
practices, both the practices themselves and those sociologists who have studied
them are considered to be less moral than the truly unequal and unjust social
forms and the ideas and research practices they generated that these situated
practices and characters have replaced.
This is backwards. Garfinkel’s transformation of the person into a situated
actor, and location into situated action are designed to capture the uniquely con-
stitutive quality of ongoing face-to-face interaction. He has, from the beginning,
talked about trust and reciprocity – moral issues – as strongly implicated in the
production of situated action and identity, in ways that must be respected by all
participants in situations (Garfinkel, 1963; Rawls, 1989). Garfinkel’s trans-
formation of time into situated interactional time shared by all competent 
participants in a situation: time used by actors to order interactional sequences,
time standing at the heart of the coherence of practices is equally implicated in
the issue of situated morality.
Far from lacking a conception of time, and being politically conservative as a
result, Garfinkel’s position offers a conception of interactional time that
requires a new way of orienting toward moral issues in modern societies.
Society in its traditional forms may have all but disappeared as many have said
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but people still make sense and connect with one another in public places, they
still face inequality and exclusion and feel disconnection – they just do so in
new forms. New ways of thinking about social orders and the moral issues
inherent therein are required.
Sequentiality is the time dimension in and through which persons mobilize
and organize the enactment of practices and the presentation of identities that
comprise the order and meaning of modern society. Time, in this regard, is the
sequential time of interactional face-to-face relations. As such, time is a consti-
tutive feature of practices, and trust and reciprocity are implicated in its use. The
order in which things are said and done – their placement before or after one
another – is constitutive of how they mean.
As Garfinkel (1948/2005) says, a person may have many thoughts at once,
but they cannot say them all at once. Faced with others with whom one wants to
communicate – and with whom one has little in common – it is necessary to 
participate in orderly ways in recognizable practices. Some things have to be
done and said first and others next. This placement of turns at practice first and
next is one of the principal means by which people can indicate to one another
what they mean. A second thing said or done can mark the interpretation of a
first and so on. A thing said or done (or not done) after a question or statement
can mean something very different from the same thing said before.
The position of action in a sequence is a part of what and how it ‘means’. This
quality of time as a relationship between parts of interaction is not new – all face-
to-face interactions have this character in all types of society, but the heavy
reliance of modern societies on practices in which time – sequentiality – is the
organizing principle with no fallback on shared beliefs, or biography, where 
cultural artifacts (already made) are not standing in the wings providing a shared
ritual symbolic basis for understanding, is new. That words and gestures have 
different meanings according to their sequential placement must become a focus
of attention in interaction. As Garfinkel (1948/2005: 106) says, ‘any sign can 
signify anything’, an early statement of the principle of indexicality, and partici-
pants must attend to this possibility in constant and developing sequential details.
Individual and Historical Time Versus Sequential Time
When time is treated as an individual experience, it is generally portrayed as
having a primarily inner dimension in the flow of experience and is treated as
unidirectional (from present to future, although it is available to reflection) and
related to individual projects and goals. When time is treated as natural or 
historical, it is typically treated as external to individual experience and a 
characteristic property of social forms. In the case of external time, individuals
are said to use abstract concepts to represent a historical time series to them-
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selves. In both cases, the flow of time is represented as moving from past to
future (even Schutz’s (1962) vivid present is oriented toward a future; it just
never gets there).
For both individual and historical conceptions of time, the question of
whether solipsism or positivism come into play is a problem. With regard to
solipsism, if time is a feature of individual experience the problem is how
people share it or communicate about it. In the case of positivism, if time is truly
external, it is not possible for any individual to have an authentic experience of
it. They must use conceptual representation, or belief, in place of the thing
which they never actually experience.
Garfinkel (1948/2005) considers these various conceptions of time. All are
characteristic of some social perspective, but, according to him all are ulti-
mately derived from the constitutive sequential time of the vivid present:
Each type of social relationship has its particular type of time perspective, though
each type is derived from the vivid present. There is the quasi-present in which the
actor interprets the outcome of the other’s communicating actions without having
participated in the ongoing process of the communicating acts [before taking a
turn]. There is the peculiar time dimension in which the actor is connected with
contemporaries he has never met, or with successors, or predecessors. There is the
historical time in which the actor experiences the actual present as the outcome 
of past events. And so on. All of them originate in the intersecting of duree and
cosmic time. (p. 182)
While both inner and external time originate in the vivid present, interactional
time is different from the conceptions of both inner and external time. Its
sequential constitutive properties – the commitment it requires – distinguish it
from the others.
By recognizing the character of time as an organizing feature of mutual social
interaction, Garfinkel avoids the problems of both solipsism and positivism. 
His argument has in common with Durkheim (1893/1933) the principle that,
because an experience comes from a social event in which time was an ordering
principle, the experience is both shared among all parties to the social event, and
thus available to them all in the same way, and also experienced as an element
of internal time flow during the event.
But, for Garfinkel, unlike Durkheim, sequential time is not just an outcome of
interaction: something that already exists. It is an intrinsic ordering principle
that creates a relationship between the parts of ongoing interaction moving 
forward. After the fact, accounts and narratives can be constructed that place the
event into a larger context of order. This would be time in a historic sense. But,
these accounts are not part of the original sequential order. They do not 
themselves constitute the ordered relationship between parts, or sequences, of
interaction and, thus, can be both challenged and changed. Their ‘truth’ depends
more on the perspective of the teller than on the order of the events themselves.
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For Garfinkel this distinction between developing orders, and orders in retro-
spect is an important one. Throughout his writing, Garfinkel distinguished
between accounts as retrospective matters and prospective sequential orders.9 In
the 1948 manuscript the distinction is made in the following way: there are,
Garfinkel (1948/2005) says, ‘at least two types of signs’. The first is ‘the ready-
made outcome of the other’s communicating acts, as, for example, a signpost’.
These he calls ‘culture’. These signs already exist, do not require constitutive
work to make them and can be oriented retrospectively. The second type of sign
is one to which the actor attends as it is being produced, where that production
is an integral part of the understanding, as for instance, he says, 
two persons engrossed in conversation. In this latter type the signs are conveyed
piece-meal, portion by portion and within a framework of space and time [sequen-
tially]. While the one actor conveys his thought through this sequential order of
actions, the interpreter follows with interpreting actions. (p. 181)
The first type, the ‘signpost’ or ‘culture’ is already made and does not require
interactive collaboration. The interpretation of this type of sign is thus retro-
spective and the interpretation of it is not interactive. The second is made over
the course of a developing sequence and depends on the joint and ongoing inter-
pretive efforts of parties to the conversation over its course.
Sequential time – as an order of ongoing events – is different from time as an
abstraction. It is not a property of narrative accounts produced after the fact, but
a feature of how events are ordered by actors to make them intelligible in the
first place – going forward – by attending to the placement of sequences one
after the other. In the 1948 manuscript Garfinkel describes what we might call
sequence pairs:
A acts towards B as if the signs that B provides are not haphazardly given. When
we say that A understands B we mean only this: that A detects an orderliness 
in these signs both with regard to sequence and meanings. The orderliness is
assigned to B’s activities by A. The ‘validity’ of A’s conception of the signs 
generated by B are given in accordance with some regulative principle established
for A when his return action evokes a counter action that somehow ‘fits’ A’s
anticipations. (p. 184, emphasis in orginal)
Sequentiality involves a relationship between a first and a next where each has
implications for the coherence of the other – in both directions – and each next
can change the coherence of everything that went before as an ongoing and con-
stantly developing matter. This forward–backward character of interactional
exchange, reflecting back on itself as it moves forward – as a method of moving
forward – is what Garfinkel meant by reflexivity.
Sequential time is not time used in the interpretation of existing or concluded
events, but a property of those events as they move forward: an interrelationship
between the parts. Furthermore, if all parties do not attend to the significance of
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sequential placement in the same way, in the same event, immediate problems
will result which will need to be attended to on the spot. The remedies for
problems also make use of time as an ordering element of the remedy, or
problem account. Thus, there is little room for what is conventionally meant by
ambiguity, or solipsism, with regard to the sequential time of mutually intel-
ligible practices.
Garfinkel recognized that in the flow of conversational events, as one thing
follows another, the second event can change the meaning of, or give meaning
to, the first. Because this is true, order – sequence or sequential time – offers a
valuable resource for communication that all communicative practices make 
use of. Because these sequential orderings are constitutive of conversational
practice, participants must attend to sequential orders of possibility, and social
practices must be made to develop in such a way that complex elements of 
possible sequencing are incorporated into them moment by moment in expected
and recognizable ways. These sequential orders don’t usually project into the
future much farther than the next move, and the time dimension of interaction
is, according to Garfinkel, experienced as what Schutz (1962) called a ‘vivid 
present’, rather than as a movement toward a future from a past.
In fact, sequentiality turns out to be one of the more important and constant
features of interactional practice. This has been demonstrated most dramatically
by conversational analysis. Building on Garfinkel’s initial insights and inspired
by the pioneering work of Harvey Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff, Gail Jefferson
and Anita Pomerantz (1975), conversation analysis demonstrates the impor-
tance of turns as a distribution system for ordering interaction.10 In their work,
sequential time, conceptualized as a turn-taking-system, is demonstrated as an
organizational feature of conversation.
Because sequential time not only occurs in public space, but the practices for
ordering sequences must be oriented toward by all competent participants in any
interaction, sequential time is experienced simultaneously, and in the same way,
by all participants. Consequently, time, for Garfinkel is not only a property of
individual inner experience, although it is also that. But, to the extent that time
is an ordering principle of social practices – the time of interactional sequences
– it is the same experience simultaneously for all participants. In this way
Garfinkel’s conception avoids solipsism. Sequencing is a way of making – and
distinguishing – moves: a public and shared dimension of time.
Sequentiality as an Order of Public Interpretation
The order in which things are said and done, their placement before and after
one another is a large part of what they will come to mean: part of how they
mean what they mean. Sequentiality is the time dimension within (through)
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which persons mobilize and organize the enactment of practices and the presen-
tation of self-identity that comprise the order and meaning of modern society.
Faced with others with whom one wants to communicate, it is necessary to
participate in an orderly way in practices. Some things have to be said and done
first and others next. This placement of turns at practice first and next turns out
to be one of the principal means by which people can indicate to one another
what they mean. Sequencing in interaction is one very important way of indi-
cating what a particular action means. It can always been seen as related to what
came before it. And what comes after it will be related to it. What something
means at one moment – to the speaker and to others – can be changed com-
pletely by what comes next. Jokes play on this possibility, but this is a constant
feature of conversation as a whole, not only jokes.
Communication, according to Garfinkel (1948/2005), ‘is a temporal process’.
Thoughts may occur all at once. But, they cannot be spoken all at once. ‘If one
will reflect on his own experience,’ he says, they ‘will find that the succession
of thought as it occurs “internally” undergoes a selective ordering process 
in which form it is presented “piece by piece” to the other fellow’ (p. 185).
Conversation proceeds utterance by utterance.
Everything – what all speakers say and do – goes into making up what the
communication will finally have meant. Garfinkel refers to the actor as a
symbol treater and says that the symbol treater, ‘in treating these signs [of the
other] generates further arrays of signs for treatment’ (p. 179). This, he says,
results in a sequence built by both parties to the conversation that is organized
by its temporal properties and is part of the immediate temporal experience of
both: ‘the communicator does not experience only what he actually utters. A
complicated mechanism of retentions and anticipations serve to connect one
element of his speech with whatever preceded and what will follow until the
unity of what he wants to convey has been grasped’ (p. 181).
With regard to such sequences, the timing and placement of the elements 
contribute to meaning. The way in which thoughts will be presented – the order,
choice and placement of words – are all interpreted with regard to their 
relevance to the situation and time in which they are spoken and to the situated
identity being accomplished.
Garfinkel (2002) uses a tutorial with a metronome to introduce students to the
idea that time does not order practice – practice makes and orders time (see 
also Rawls, 2002). He distinguishes between ‘making the time we need’ and
‘clapping in time’ with the metronome. The point of this tutorial is that in order
to make use of the metronome as an ordering device for clapping it is necessary
to organize the clapping so that it covers the sound of the metronome. Although
one might hear the metronome behind a piano softly playing, his point is that we
have organized ourselves such that we would not have to hear it.
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Sequences in Details
The elements of practice that comprise recognizable elements of ordering,
placement, and sequencing, Garfinkel refers to in the 1948 manuscript as 
‘tactics’ and ‘strategy’. Later he will refer to sequences in terms of their details
only and not in terms of abstractions like these. These details constitute a
sequential ordering of parts: a time element. For Garfinkel (1948/2005) ‘the 
tactics and the strategy arise from the fact that the agent cannot present his
“stream of thought” at one instant’ (p. 185). Not only does communication
require a temporal ordering, but the tactics and strategies involved in this 
temporal ordering vary from situated practice to situated practice and from 
situated identity to situated identity.
This emphasis on tactics, as elements in a situated temporal sequence 
by sequence mutually built and developing horizon of order, distinguishes
Garfinkel’s position from the usual assumption that tactics and strategies arise
in the individual mind (or as a feature of the developing trajectory of an indi-
vidual’s actions) as plans for accomplishing an individual actor’s ‘projects’.
Garfinkel maintains that mutual intelligibility – the possibility of communica-
tion between people – requires a mutual engagement between people in a
sequential production in which they must make use of tactics and strategies that
are situated as methods for presenting their ‘thoughts’ in a form recognizable to
others which, thus, conveys meaning to them.
This conversational/interactional form is inherently sequential. That is, the
ordering features of talk – the placement of utterances – is a huge and essential
tool that people use to render their ‘thoughts’ in a mutually intelligible form.
And they never manage this without having the sequential back and forth 
character of interaction change what they mean. That is, what they will 
have meant in the end – even to themselves – will be what emerges from a 
collaborative sequential production, not what they thought they meant before
the sequential series was produced.11
Each situation has different practices and situated identities that are relevant
to it. The actor – as a ‘symbol treater’ who is enacting a particular situated 
identity – must produce speech that is recognized as appropriate to both the 
situated identity and the situation in which that situated identity enacts itself.
According to Garfinkel (1948/2005), ‘communication refers to the process
wherein the actor treats an array of signs . . . and in treating these signs gener-
ates further arrays of signs for treatment’ (p. 179).
Treating the actor as a whole person pursuing a project obscures this process,
because it obscures the fact that they must enact a different identity from situa-
tion to situation and do so by enacting practices that are appropriate to the 
situation. In doing so, the whole-person – or demographic – approach, obscures
the orderly and patterned ways in which actors use practices to produce their
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identities and make sense in situated contexts of action. Focusing on the whole
person results in looking for motives and projects rather than focusing on the
constitutive features of sequential interaction.
Sequential Orders Versus Projects
One way of explaining the prospective ordering of interaction was offered by
pragmatism: that individuals are pursuing projects. Schutz (1962) offers a more
sociological version of this argument wherein what projects can be is con-
strained by something like conceptual frames. Parsonian sociology employs a
different form of the same argument in which individual behavior is explained
as an orientation toward socially defined goals and projects to be pursued. 
For both of them the individual stands at the center, and action orients toward
anticipated future goals. In spite of the fact that Schutz is considered micro 
and individual while Parsons is generally thought of as dealing with macro
structures, they are the same in placing the individual at the center.
The underlying idea is that social orders result from an aggregate of indi-
viduals pursuing their separate projects together. In order for this to work, how-
ever, others would have to be able to ‘see’ what persons are trying to achieve.
The various projects would also need to be coordinated. As long as people 
pursue projects the value of which are broadly shared within the society, it
might be possible to achieve some social order in this way. In a traditional com-
munity, for instance, in which people know each other well and share beliefs,
customs and goals, others may be able to see in the actions of others something
of the projects they pursue. But, even then, because much of interaction must be
negotiated bit by bit, and projects and goals simply do not provide the means 
for doing that, a background of intelligibility – constructed through situated
practice – would be necessary, even where projects were shared and visible.
If social order is thought to result from an aggregation of individual projects,
time matters in a particular sort of way. Individuals come together with their
projects. The projects themselves have a trajectory. Only if one person’s 
projects can be brought into conjunction with another’s can they become part 
of a joint reality. For Schutz (1945), they do not have the accent of reality, or 
are taken for granted, until this happens. So conceived, individual projects
would begin in the mind. They would have a history in which they begin in
anticipation without the accent of reality, then are brought into interactions and
either receive the accent of reality, because they are successfully coordinated 
with others, or do not get the accent of reality because they fail in this coordina-
tion.
Time would, in this sense, be the history of projects. It would follow projects
from place to place. Projects themselves would have histories and their histories
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would belong to the individual persons who anticipate and subsequently initiate
them. Joint projects would be part of the history of groups.
Garfinkel’s time focus is on the more immediate matter of how sequences
ever get enough coherence to become part of joint projects in the first place.
This problem of intelligibility, and the role played by detailed orderings in it, is
generally overlooked by conventional thinkers. Garfinkel notes that sequences
establish relationships between the parts of interaction that make coherent
orders of meaning possible.
Instructed Action Versus Projects
Garfinkel’s (2002) idea that instructions have praxeological validity is instruc-
tive in contrasting his position with Schutz. Instructions indicate a trajectory for
action. But, unlike projects, they belong to situations and events, not persons.
Instructions have sequential properties. Instructions, in Garfinkel’s sense, must
also be distinguished from rules. Rules, as traditionally conceived, may be said
to exist in advance of being followed. This introduces a time dimension 
with regard to rules that is not the same as Garfinkel’s. Unlike a project that is
intended before the fact, or rules that are construed as a set, one cannot know
what instructions mean until they are in the process of being followed. They
exist only over a sequential time series. They are instructable, but there is both
more and less in the instructing than the instructions. The actions taken in 
following the instructions are part of the coherence of the instructions.
For Garfinkel, sitting with a set of instructions in front of you for assembling
a chair, one cannot ‘see’ how to follow the instructions. It is the following, over
a sequential time series, that makes the instructions coherent. Certainly the page
of instructions is experienced as real. But, the anticipated following has no
coherence because one cannot ‘see’ how to follow the instructions. They are not
a description of the process. One looks at the page and tries to see how to follow
the instructions. One sometimes turns the page this way and that trying to see
how it ‘fits’ the pile of parts one has on the floor. One sometimes moves the
parts themselves around.
Usually there is a first step that one can follow, and then with some more 
‘trying to see’ a second step. Often after one or two steps, several more steps
will appear to be clear. The way of seeing what to do begins to be clear. But,
even when this happens it can turn out at some next step that something has
been done wrong at an earlier stage. Then one has to go back, retracing steps,
until one finds the mistake that can now be seen. Then the following steps –
already taken – rearrange themselves and are seen differently even though one
might say they had been ‘real’ and have been taken concretely and ‘seen’.
Instructed action is not a process of bringing an anticipation to reality. In fact,
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it is the reverse; a process of bringing reality to an anticipation. That is, antici-
pation is vague, or abstract, until one begins to work out how things might go
together. Like a conversation – one starts with something that is constantly
changing and becoming something else.
It is a very concrete process of enacting a series of steps that will come to
complete a course of action. The steps cannot be imagined until they are being
done. Of course the person has the intention, or project, of completing or build-
ing the item. But, that project is completely irrelevant to the actual doing of the
work that brings the item into being. The project cannot be used to build the
item. There is no sense in which the project becomes more real as the item is
built, either. The project was a real intention in the first place. In that sense the
project, as a project, was always complete. But, the item is not complete until
the sequence of its building can be clearly seen. And, the intention as an out-
come that can be imputed to the builder does not exist until the sequential series
is complete. Intentions, in this sense, come at the end, not at the beginning of
things.
In fact, the completed item is sometimes so different from what the person
intended that they are disappointed and realize that, while they have success-
fully produced the required sequence of moves, they have not realized what they
had thought of as their ‘intended’ project. In other words, the ‘intention’ in
advance and the intention as an outcome are not always relevant to one another.
Without accomplishing their intention, a person may nevertheless have
followed a series of steps for assembling an object, and both that object and that
process have been completed successfully. It is not intentions or projects that
give action meaning.
The difference between Garfinkel and those who see interaction as ordered
by projects, is that the latter are talking about bringing an anticipated mental
project to reality through a series of steps. The idea is that at the beginning the
project is only a thought and has no reality. At the end it exists in an inter-
subjective world and its reality is acknowledged by others. This is a time
sequence over the course of which, they argue, epistemological validity is
achieved as intentions are actualized.
Garfinkel, as we saw earlier, points out that this does not happen. What he
argues is quite different. People may indeed bring anticipated projects to inter-
action, but these are not what concern him. In order to bring any projects to
fruition, Garfinkel realized that people would have to have some methods for
doing so. The important thing about an interaction is not that a project that 
was only imagined has at some point become real for the participants. The
important thing is the medium through which something mutually intelligible
has been achieved: the member’s methods for producing mutually recognizable
sequences.
This medium transforms both the anticipated project and the outcome, and
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time plays an important role in the transformation. One may bring a project to
an encounter. But, the ways that things must get done there will determine how
that project can come out. The person will have to come to understand their 
project in a developing way that allows it to be constructed out of those methods
available as sequences unfold.
Even more importantly, there are dynamics, not only of methods, but of 
reciprocity with regard to others, that are critical to any situated interaction.
These dynamics will exert an influence on every project. Not only will indi-
vidual projects be changed over the course of the interaction, but individuals
will change their own understandings of what they wanted in the first place.
These initial understandings may even fade entirely into the background as
actors get caught up in the general interactional exchange, sequence by
sequence, which takes all their attention as they are engaged in it over its course.
They cannot attend to imagined projects while also being fully absorbed in 
managing the necessary interactional reciprocities over their sequential course.
Trust, Sequences and Motivation
It is the elements of communicative sequencing, by which Garfinkel means the
recognizably produced features of situated identity and practice, that effect 
the plan of presentation in any given situation.
In considering the sequential aspects of situated practice Garfinkel (1948/
2005) early on, in the 1948 manuscript, made a distinction between strategy –
which involved a situated orientation to the whole of the ongoing interaction –
and its sequential properties over its course, and what he called ‘sub-strategies,’
which operated across short sequences of turns, or what he called an extended
series. ‘If strategy be considered to designate the communicative “plan” as 
it appears to the “auditor” [hearer]’, he says, ‘then tactics refer to the sub-
strategies which operate in extended series’ (p. 184).
While Schutz (1945) had focused on ‘projects,’ and Parsons (1937) had
focused on broader life goals and values, Garfinkel began by situating strategies
and tactics in particular locations of interaction within which people have
involvement obligations because of the need for reciprocity – that is, all parties
to the interaction must orient toward the same practices in recognizably the
same ways.
The importance of interactional detail cannot be overemphasized. Garfinkel
is proposing ‘sub-strategies’ that operate sequentially, and distinguishes those
from plans that operate as valued (even situated) goals, or situated courses of
action more generally. There is something essentially ‘in its own right’ about
the sequences of action that he calls sub-strategies. Unlike ‘projects’ more 
conventionally conceived, they take their own coherence as an end, and their
RAWLS: GARFINKEL’S CONCEPTION OF TIME 179
sequential properties are intrinsic to their coherence. They may have an objec-
tive in the situation beyond themselves, but they don’t accomplish anything if
they themselves are not coherent – so the order of sequences demands a great
deal of attention in its own right.
The order of sequences is in this sense an example of something rather pure –
ends in themselves – and, as Garfinkel (1963) will argue later, in the ‘trust’
paper, they demand a rather pure reciprocity on their own behalf. They have
coherence as sequences, and they make demands on reciprocity and attentive-
ness, just in their own right, as orderly sequences of action, regardless of 
intended outcomes.
As such, they offer a very different answer to the motivation question. Any per-
son with the intention of being understood must attend to the careful building of
such sequences. Thus, attention to sequential orders always supercedes goals and
objectives as a motivation in the immediate time frame of ongoing interaction.
The essence of mutual intelligibility, for Garfinkel, consists in these situated
sequential orders. Actors are constrained to build meaningful sequences of
action in just the ways that are appropriate to the situations they find themselves
in, with regard to just those identities they are trying to present. Changes in
sequential orders will result in changes in identity. Thus, not only is this situated
order real, and can be observed in details, but its order is necessary and conse-
quential. Any meaningful action – in order to be meaningful – must display such
an order, and recognizably.
The Performance of Speaker and Hearer
Garfinkel (1948/2005) refers to this developing horizon of communicative
utterances as a ‘performance’ in which selves, confronting one another in a
face-to-face situation, construct both the intelligibility of the situation and the
identity of their respective selves within it:
Like a working action it is a performance for it embodies an intention to realiza-
tion. The listener experiences the occurrences of the other’s action as events
occurring in outer time and space, while at the same time he experiences his 
interpretive actions as a series of retentions and anticipations happening in his
inner time and connected by the intention to understand the other’s ‘message’ as a
meaningful unit. (p. 181)
While the interaction goes on, the listener and hearer share an orientation
toward space and time in which their inner and outer experiences intersect in
what Garfinkel calls a ‘common vivid present. Both can say later, “We experi-
enced this occurrence together”’ (p. 181). This is the common present of
sequential exchange.
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There is, however, an important difference between the positions of speaking
and listening. The speakers hear and see themselves while speaking and 
monitor what they are saying to see whether it has conveyed what they meant.
‘All of these experiences belong to the communicator’s inner time duree’. The
listener on the other hand has a different job. They have to grasp the point, see
what type of action the communicator is making, and ready themselves for a
response that displays whatever understanding they have made of the utterance.
The job of the hearer – the observer – is to make what they can of what the
speaker says. Their orientation toward the interaction is therefore different.
The positions of speaker and hearer change continually over the course of
interaction – each has different obligations and each involves a different aware-
ness of self and other. But, both are mutually engaged, and as Garfinkel says:
‘Both vivid presents occur simultaneously. A new time dimension is therefore
established, that of a common vivid present’ (p. 181).
The sequence of turns – the exchange of positions of speaker and hearer back
and forth – creates a common shared historical sequence, a time frame, which
the two (or more) have shared in a very special way. They built it together out of
their collaborative work and it would not exist except for that collaborative
work, and does not exist unless that work is successful.
Reflexive, or Sequential, Interpretation
Each person understands the signs produced in these sequences in their own
way – but because they are built in a progression, as sequences, each of which
confirms (or does not confirm) the anticipations of the prior speaker, there is a
mutual orientation to orderliness that keeps differences in the interpretation of
symbols from being a problem. Each can see what the other takes their utterance
to have meant. And they can revise their own understanding as they go along.
Ordinary language philosophers (see in particular Paul Grice, 1957), have
argued that there is no way of understanding whether the person you are speak-
ing to has understood you. Garfinkel describes an order of conversational
sequencing in which there is a constant confirmation of understanding as par-
ticipants go forward. This sequential order does not require that all parties
understand everything in just the same way. But, each next utterance, while it
may mean somewhat different things to different parties to the conversation,
works only by establishing a mutual understanding of the last. This provides a
mechanism for the constant mutual display of understanding in which the next
speakers continually confirm or disconfirm the expectations of prior speakers,
and actors are not left in doubt as to whether others have understood them.
The way Garfinkel handles interpretation sequentially avoids the whole
problem of how two people get the same idea. They don’t need to. The speaker
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says something. Then it is up to the hearer/observer to make what they can of it.
They construct an action that responds to what they have made of what the other
did. The other can tell a good bit from this about how they have understood
what they did. Sometimes they even learn something they did not know about
what they did. You might make what you thought of as a compliment: ‘You
look good today’ and the person says ‘Oh, so I don’t usually?’ This is not a 
misunderstanding on the part of the hearer. It is new information about how
what one said could be heard. It could also be a joke and it might be a problem.
But, only further utterances can tell if this is so. That is, if the first speaker 
doesn’t take it as a joke it isn’t, unless and until, the second speaker says it is
and has that confirmed by the first, and so on.
The essential point is that meaning emerges over a sequential course of utter-
ances. It is the job of the observer to make what they can of what someone says.
The speaker is busy building a practice in a recognizable and appropriate style.
They are deeply embedded in the natural attitude and cannot think about what
they are doing. The observer can. Then they switch places and the former
speaker becomes the observer and makes what they can of what the prior
speaker said. This is their turn to reflect on the sequence. They display their
understanding to one another sequentially and in this way ‘confirm’ for one
another the understandings they have reached, whether mutual or not.
When Garfinkel worries about the adequacy of scientific observation (in
social science), the worry is as follows: the serious problem with scientific
observation is that it stops after the first part. The scientific observer interprets,
but because they are not part of the ongoing activity they have no opportunity
turn by turn to check out their understandings. If they stop the action to ask – or
ask afterwards – neither of those moves has the same confirming character of a
sequential exchange. Asking treats something as an accomplishment – as just a
thing – that is in fact a complex sequential order, whose meaning is its order – as
accomplished over its course – and not an account given after the fact. People
do not consciously know and cannot tell about these orders. They are taken for
granted. In fact, as Garfinkel’s (1967) research shows, people get angry if others
try to confirm understandings in this way, by asking. And it is an infinite regress
anyway because shared understanding is required for every utterance involved
in the clarification. Confirming meaning can only be done by building – not
clarifying – sequentially.
This is the real difference between ethnomethodology and other forms of
field method. The ethnomethodologist must insert themselves into the situation
and get their information in the way that ordinary actors do, sequence by
sequence. Interpretations must be confirmed on the spot – and not after the fact
– not by asking, but by doing, sequence by sequence.
Ethnomethodologists know that they cannot ask actors what they were doing
or what it meant. People cannot say how they order sequences: the process is
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taken for granted, and must be discovered as an order of affairs, not as an
account. Ethnomethodologists, as a consequence, do not focus on typifications
that they think actors are using, or on projects that actors may be orienting
toward. For an ethnomethodologist not to be fully and completely embedded in
the situation, not just for part of the time, but while they collect and analyze
their data, is a problem. The conventional objectivity that researchers value, in
fact, prevents understanding. Every interpretation by a researcher can only
receive confirmation by making a move in a developing sequence that gets a
response, which requires being embedded in the ongoing sequential order and
even then over and over again.
Conclusion
While a conception of time is a necessary element of any social theory, it was
only in the nineteenth century that time itself became a focus of analysis. Marx
(1992) recognized that analyzing contradictions in the production of social
inequality involved relations over time. Durkheim (1893/1933) recognized that
particular configurations of time had a social element, and that time was 
consequently not experienced in the same way, was not even the same thing in
different societies.
In the twentieth century, social thinkers focused on the development of the
western notion of time, contrasted modern and traditional time, and pointed out
that the clock time we have come to live by developed in tandem with factory
life: that is, with western capitalism. Similarly, the idea of punishment in units
of time in prisons developed at the same time that payment for labor by units of
time appeared in the factory.
Pragmatism and phenomenology both involved a focus on time as an element
of the organization of perception. Existentialism analyzed the relationship being
and time. Norbert Elias (1987/1992) and Karl Mannheim (1952) outlined 
sociologies of knowledge that included time as a central figure. Time is also
involved in the idea of rational choice as social action oriented toward norms
and goals.
Garfinkel’s refusal to address this increasingly important focus on time in
conventional terms has created the impression that he takes time for granted. He
does not. His treatment of time as sequential is informed by consideration of
pragmatism and phenomenology, as well as the more conventional structural
perspectives of Parsons and Marx.
Even so, Garfinkel’s focus on sequential time will still be a concern to some.
They will feel that it is impossible to consider the ‘important’ questions, which
they feel are larger than the situation, from the standpoint of sequential time. It
seems ironic, however, that on the conventional view, an individual’s orienta-
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tion toward projects in terms of norms and values is considered to be an indi-
cation of something called the ‘larger social structure’ and is therefore worthy
of study, while the sequential structures which require mutuality and thus make
collectivity possible are considered to be small and individual.
If we accept the need for attention to sequential orders (or ‘methods’) for 
rendering bits of interaction recognizable we must also recognize a need to
rethink the conceptions of the actor, group, place and time. The actor must be
the one in just this place, attending to just this interactional matter, engaged in
attending to the production of just this sequential detail. The group is that con-
stituted by just these actors, just so occupied, in sequentially producing just this
practice, just here, just now. Furthermore, action is not only embedded in
sequences of time – but its coherence consists largely in its sequential order.
This is the social order that historical time assumes but does not examine.
All four of Garfinkel’s transformations (actor, place, group and time) are
designed to take into account the situated character of social orders (Rawls,
1987, 2005). Formal institutional orders involve accounts, which work retro-
spectively (Mills, 1940; Rawls, 1987). But, interaction must be built first time
through each time it is done, or as Garfinkel says ‘each next first time’.
Participants must be able to ‘see’ what it is that others are doing and saying
before they can interpret what they have done and produce either sequential
interpretations, or retrospective accounts. That requires a prospective ordering
of events that cannot be accomplished by accounts or formal orders. Of course
the need – or potential need – to produce an account later can also become a 
feature of the prospective ordering of situated practices.12
Not only does Garfinkel develop a conception of time that is central to his
position, but his conception is crucial to understanding modern societies. The
idea of historical time that informs the positions from which Garfinkel is 
challenged: the idea of time as history, is a product of the development of
modernity that does not question the reliance of the coherence of modernity on
sequences of time: the question Garfinkel takes up. As such, this conventional
conception of time obscures what it claims to represent.
Typically, conceptions of time involve the inner time flow of individual expe-
rience, the time of natural events (or external time), to what extent either or both
are influenced by social relations (or the reverse), and the relationship between
the two. For all the substantial differences between them, this is as much true of
Pragmatism and Phenomenology as it is of Parsons and Weber. And, while
Durkheim and Marx consistently treated time as both a social construction and
as an element of social construction – they still placed their emphasis on the
history of praxis instead of on time as an internal dynamic of practices.
By contrast with this tradition, Garfinkel recognizes that time, as an ordering
principle of interaction, is constitutive of a public and shared dimension of
experience: he recognizes that time, in its sequential character, while public, is
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nevertheless also experienced both internally and simultaneously by all partici-
pants who are successfully engaged in the same interaction.
Norbert Elias (1987/1992), one of the more important scholars of time,
argued that time is a social convention which developed to allow people to com-
pare things that do not happen at the same time or place. One of his main points,
which he shares with Garfinkel, is that time as a social convention reproduces
the structure of the society and its state of development, not a natural phenome-
non. That we have thought of time as an objective measure and not as a social
construction has introduced an element of positivism into most social, scientific
and historical studies.
But, this is not what is important about the contrast between Garfinkel and
Elias. For Garfinkel, time is also a social construction. Where their positions 
differ is that for Elias the focus was on the development of a social convention
that could be used in the abstract to make comparisons across populations and
events. He argued that this development was critical to the development of
modern societies. Elias did not consider the possibility that time was itself an
ordering principle of social action in situ.
Elias even suggests that the idea of time as an in-situ phenomenon is a
problem, arguing that when people only use, or conceptualize, time in this way
their societies have not developed. It is the development of the abstract idea of
time that signals the development of a society for Elias. This is a very western-
centric view, one the one hand, and also, ironically, one that ignores significant
developments toward a practice-based interaction order in modern western 
societies. Quite a paradox.
In this regard, Elias’s position differs from Garfinkel’s in the same way that
Parsons’s does. In studying social order, Parsons was not interested in particular
instances of social order. He didn’t expect them to reveal anything interesting.
What he wanted were abstractions that could be applied to broad collections of
social phenomena. In fact, this is true of almost all social science. The search
has been for abstractions, and time has been treated as just another such abstrac-
tion.
Instead of seeking abstractions, Garfinkel has searched for order in details.
One of the most persistent criticisms of ethnomethodology, in fact, has been that
it does not get beyond details. What are all the details for? Why can’t ‘these
people’ make up some abstractions?
As soon as a conventional field researcher begins to see some patterns, they
make up abstractions: typifications. Ethnomethodologists respond that these
abstractions entirely lose the social orders they claim to represent. But, con-
ventional thinkers don’t question their faith in abstractions, and it is a faith.
Meanwhile, ethnomethodologists continue to be ridiculed for their interest in
details. Garfinkel’s point is that order and intelligibility are constituted in and
through the details and so also the solutions to the problems of order, justice and
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inequality lie in those same details. If abstractions entirely lose the details, any
social science that resorts to abstractions must, by definition, fail.
This focus on abstractions extends to the treatment of time. The insistence that
time as an abstraction is superior to situated time, while related to other criticisms
of ethnomethodology, is largely responsible for to the criticisms of Garfinkel for
not focusing on history. According to Elias (1987/1992), an ability to compare –
to develop measures of comparison – is critical to social development. He con-
siders that a society that has not developed such abstractions is not developed as a 
society. While this may or may not be the case (and is a strikingly western-centric
view, many non-western languages not having past or present tenses), it is 
essentially irrelevant to a consideration of studies of interaction.
For Garfinkel there is a parallel between focusing on time as a way of com-
paring aspects of different groups and the focus of conventional social science
on the demographic characteristics of groups. In both cases, Garfinkel argues,
an understanding of how coherent social phenomena are produced is being 
sacrificed so that we can produce a fictively objective measurement across
groups and situations. And, as Elias himself contends, the measures are not
objective – the abstractions are social constructions and at best relative.
Whether there is any truth to Elias’s claim that societies cannot develop until
they develop the idea of time as history, time in both traditional and modern
societies constitutes an essential aspect of the ordering process in ways that a
focus on historical time does not capture – and in fact obscures. So, here is a
question for Elias: can societies develop until they have developed an idea of
time as a sequential ordering principle of mutually intelligible practices?
In so far as interaction in either traditional or modern societies is ordered,
time, as a sequential phenomenon, must constitute an element of its ordering,
whether or not people have developed an abstract conception of time.
Because time as an abstraction is itself a social construction and results from
social settings, as an abstract conception, time cannot be used to understand
what goes on in the processes that produce it. But, time as an ordering feature of
interaction is still very much relevant and can be found concretely in situ.
Elias’s main point was that time itself has not been studied. He was certainly
right about that at the time – and in spite of increased interest over the past few
decades, time is still a neglected area of study. But, it is essential to note, in this
regard, that neither type of time has been studied. It is all well and good to point
out that time is a social convention that reflects the structure of the society 
and that we need to study it as such. But, it is also true that time as an ordering
principle of interaction is a social convention and as such it should also be 
studied. If we are interested in how time reflects the social structure of a society,
we should also be interested in how that social structure is ordered in its own
right and in an ongoing fashion, especially if that ordering also makes use of
time.
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Notes
1. The claim that Garfinkel is not interested in questions of justice and inequality has
always been a mystery to me in any case. His first two publications (‘Color Trouble’
(Garfinkel, 1941) and ‘A Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides’
(Garfinkel, 1949) focused on issues of racial injustice – this at a time when most
white scholars were busy ignoring race altogether. Somehow, when the politics of
the 1960s defined interactional studies as conservative the label operated as a stereo-
type, like any prejudice, and as a consequence the ‘truth’, as in the content of
Garfinkel’s work, was not consulted.
2. Durkheim (1893/1933) is a partial exception in so far as he also focused on practices
and recognized their increasing significance in modern life. But, in other respects, in
so far as Durkheim retained a conventional notion of person and group, his position
continued to rely on abstractions. Because his argument was so revolutionary it had
some inconsistencies (Rawls, 2004). If his position is used to frame Garfinkel’s, the
abstractions make a nonsense of the thing. But, if Garfinkel is used to explain what
Durkheim might have been working toward there is an interesting connection
between the two positions.
3. In writing this article, I have relied heavily on an early manuscript that was finally
published in 2005 as Seeing Sociologically, but which was originally completed by
Garfinkel in 1948. I have done so, not because Garfinkel places a greater emphasis
on time in this manuscript. In fact, the ideas about sequential organization developed
there only become more important in Garfinkel’s later work. I have referred so 
frequently to the early manuscript for two reasons. First, this is where Garfinkel
explained his ideas about time, rather than just using or developing them empiri-
cally; and second, because the manuscript, since it remained unpublished for almost
60 years, is largely unknown and deserves to be written about.
4. Persons appear to have multiple and conflicting identities and often to stand at a 
distance from their own social roles, thus causing psychological distress. Garfinkel
argues that his position solves the problem of seeing an individual as divided
between multiple roles. If we take seriously the time dimension of interaction then
we can see that at each moment in time, or to be more precise, with each move that a
person makes interactionally (all moves being ordered in a time dimension sequen-
tially), they are enacting only one identity. A person does not enact two identities at
once. They may at one moment enact one identity and at the next moment another.
But each will be enacted through practices appropriate to that identity. Seeing a 
person as divided between multiple identities happens when you treat an actor as a
whole person. If we treat the actor as only the identity being enacted at any given
moment, the problem of competing roles, and of role distance disappears. There is
only one identity in one bit of situated time.
5. Generalizability and reliability require abstracting from situated orders such that
their details are lost. If there is anything important going on in situated interaction, it
would be lost to any method that generalized over time and space. Why should
action only be significant in so far as it remains constant across bits of time and
space? If the parts of action lost through abstraction are the parts that made it 
valuable and meaningful in the first place, then of what value is generalizability if it
loses them? And why would we think it was valuable in the first place? We have a
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meaningful encounter. But, as scientists, do we feel there is nothing of value in it
until we have reduced it to unrecognizable abstractions?
6. In addition to focusing on demographics and not on the relevant features of inter-
actional exclusion, methods that rely on institutional reifications (statistics) will
almost always reproduce the institutional fictions that the data was originally pro-
duced to maintain.
7. Competence is a very important criteria in this regard. Incompetent participation will
result in a lack of mutual intelligibility. Competence is assured by the mutuality of
sequences. This is called praxeological validity in Garfinkel’s (2002; see also Rawls,
2002) terms.
8. When personal characteristics cannot be put aside, problems arise. Garfinkel (2002:
Chapter 9) gives some nice examples of scientists who have been trained in one 
scientific lab and then move to another. The practices of labs differ. My favorite
story involves how the killing of a rat differs from one scientific lab to another.
Theoretical, abstract, or so-called ‘generalizeable knowledge’, the kind you get from
a textbook, can often get in the way in science labs where a shared practice is the
foundation for coordinated work. Even ‘standardized’ bench practices vary from lab
to lab. There are also implications for the study of disabilities which can prevent
people from producing practices recognizably. Derek Coates and I have done some
interesting research on blindness in this regard, with the finding that not being able
to see the unfolding of sequentiality sometimes makes it impossible to participate in
producing the orders required by mutual intelligibility (Coates and Rawls [forth-
coming]).
9. It has been my argument that one of the distinct qualities of more formal practices is
that they eliminate this step-by-step character of practices and thereby build in a
great deal of potential for ambiguity. There is also a power differential, however,
which is even more important. The step-by-step building of practices requires a high
degree of reciprocity and equality. When practices formalize, they no longer require
this and thus by moving away from step-wise practices some people can come to
wield more power than others.
10. See especially what has come to be known as ‘the turntaking paper’ by Harvey
Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson (1974). See also Sacks (1996).
11. Weber (1921/1968) says something like this about how a person finds out what they
meant when they see how others take it – how they react – a sequential placement in
a time series. However, he does not mention time in this regard (see p. 8). 
12. Garfinkel (1967) gives a good example of this in ‘Good Reasons for Bad Clinic
Records’. There he argues that the incompleteness of the intake files is oriented
toward their eventual use to produce organizational accounts. Because they are 
oriented toward this use, information that would seem to be missing from a treat-
ment or a research perspective is missing from them. Their production in its course
is oriented toward their subsequent accountable uses.
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